

OPINION



Build energy sovereignty

With energy demands shifting, Nepal needs to ramp up transmission infrastructure and export agreements.

Nepal’s hydropower potential is often touted as one of the highest per-capita power production in the world, boasting a theoretical potential of approximately 83,000 megawatts, of which around 43,000 are considered technically and economically feasible. Yet, with a total installed generation capacity of 4,200 megawatts and domestic demand hovering around 2,000 to 2,200 megawatts, the nation continues to struggle to exploit its potential.

In the last fiscal year, Nepal earned a record-high Rs29.32 billion from exporting electricity to India and Bangladesh. However, the current production and export model is fundamentally unsustainable as it remains heavily reliant on selling volatile monsoon surplus while importing power during the dry season. To secure long-term economic resilience, Nepal must capitalise on the Indian energy market while it lasts, forge proactive trilateral agreements to export power to Bangladesh, and accelerate domestic consumption.

The window of opportunity in India will not remain open indefinitely. Although India’s electricity demand is projected to reach 458.7 gigawatts by 2036, the country is rapidly diversifying its own energy sources. Its solar capacity is projected to reach 211 gigawatts, with the nation targeting 100 gigawatts of nuclear power by 2047. Under these circumstances, India will increasingly assess Nepal’s electricity based on strict parameters of price, reliability and availability. Kathmandu must acknowledge this reality.

To secure the Indian market, the state must immediately resume the stalled power purchase agreement (PPA) process, where projects representing roughly 16,500 megawatts currently languish. It is vital to negotiate long-term agreements of 5, 15 and 25 years. Furthermore, Nepal needs to invest heavily in transmission infrastructure as inadequate infrastructure currently wastes around 1,000 megawatts of generated electricity. Prioritising cross-border transmission networks, however, is not enough. Since most of Nepal’s hydropower plants are run-of-river, fast-tracking reservoir-based projects like Upper Arun, Dudhkoshi and Budhigandaki are essential steps to provide consistent, year-round electricity.

Relying on a single export market, however, exposes Nepal to geopolitical vulnerabilities. Past bilateral tensions have led to economic blockades, notably in 1969, 1988-89, and 2015-16. Power-hungry Bangladesh, currently crippled by severe gas and electricity shortages, represents an ideal partner. Bangladesh’s master plan seeks to import up to 9,000 megawatts of electricity from its neighbours. Crucially, Nepali hydropower is highly competitive. The initial bilateral agreement to export 40 megawatts to Bangladesh was priced at Tk8.35 per unit, which is 78 percent cheaper than Bangladesh’s costly imports from India. Kathmandu must proactively seek trilateral agreements with New Delhi and Dhaka to establish stable cross-border corridors.

Yet, the ultimate goal of energy sovereignty lies within Nepal. It is strategically unwise to remain heavily dependent on imported fossil fuels while wasting clean energy. Replacing imported Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG)—which costs Nepal Rs60 billion annually and is prone to chronic shortages and hoarding—with subsidised domestic induction cooktops will insulate Nepali kitchens from international supply shocks. This transition will also significantly reduce the national import bill. Here, the government could incentivise electric power consumption for cooking by providing subsidies for induction cooktops.

To absorb surplus power locally, state authorities must implement future-oriented domestic reforms. For starters, the Tarai belt could be electrified by replacing diesel water pumps with electric irrigation. A nationwide network of hybrid refrigeration units could be built to preserve agricultural harvests. Furthermore, building pumped-storage hydropower and grid-scale battery systems will stabilise local distribution networks. Looking further ahead, surplus energy can power clean digital assets, support green data centres, and produce green hydrogen to manufacture domestic chemical fertilisers.

Nepal cannot afford to fall behind in the transition to energy sovereignty. If the nation wishes to capitalise on its power potential, it must engage in bold regional diplomacy, immediate infrastructure upgrades, and a domestic electrification campaign.

—The Daily Star (Bangladesh)/ANN

The ‘Panchayat-isation’ of Deuba

Why does a political figure who fought for democracy begin to resemble the very political culture his generation had fought against?

|| HYPHEN ||

CHANDRAKISHORE



Sher Bahadur Deuba is among the figures in Nepal’s democratic history whose political biography has always carried an uncomfortable contradiction. He fought against the Panchayat system, went to jail, struggled for democracy, travelled a long journey in the politics of the Nepali Congress, became prime minister five times and also served as party president. The contradiction is not that he remained in power for a long time; in democratic politics, power itself is no crime. The real irony lies in how a leader who struggled for democracy gradually began to appear, in his public presentation, close to the same political culture his generation had fought against. I would call this irony the ‘Panchayat-isation’ of Deuba.

This is not an accusation that Deuba has become a *Panch*. For the active workers of the Panchayat system, Panch was a political identity. In Deuba’s case, it is a political metaphor.

A recent Congress meeting has once again brought his irony to the fore. Deuba’s repeated assertion, “I am a Hindu”, is, in itself, not unusual. Religious faith is a personal right. The problem begins when private faith becomes linked to the language of the reorganisation of a political organisation, national identity and political mobilisation. Then it can no longer be viewed merely within the sphere of private faith. This is where the major contradiction in Deuba’s political journey comes to the surface.

A major feature of the Panchayat system was placing the individual above the institution. The king was not merely a symbol of the nation; he was the centre of the state’s legitimacy. The space for political debate was limited. Leadership mattered more than organisation, discipline more than ideas, and power more than the citizen.

Democracy had promised exactly the opposite. In a democracy, leaders are not institutions. They are temporary representatives of the institution. A party is not the extension of any one leader, but a structure of ideas, organisation and collective decision-making. The citizen is not merely a voter but also one who questions. Yet, changing the institution-



POST ILLUSTRATION

al framework of democracy does not always change political culture. Panchayat-isation begins sometimes in the name of nationalism, sometimes in the name of religion, and sometimes in the name of a leader’s popularity.

It means excessive reverence for leadership, discomfort with questions, the growing dominance of the individual over the organisation, the tendency to treat political succession as natural, and giving more importance to the convenience of power than to the citizen. In this sense, Panchayat-isation is not only Deuba’s story. Deuba has become an interesting symbol of it because he belongs to the generation of leaders who had opposed the Panchayat.

His political legacy also faces another question. Should the future of a democratic party remain bound to one personality from its past? The crisis of the Nepali Congress is not only Deuba, but he has certainly become a symbol of that crisis.

It is useful to recall BP Koirala’s Congress. BP did not regard democracy merely as the process of multi-party elections. At the centre of his socialism were citizen dignity, political freedom and social justice. There was space for dissent and debate. BP himself could be questioned. Therefore, merely taking BP’s name repeatedly does not keep his political tradition alive. Sometimes the opposite happens.

Today, within the Congress, there

appears a danger of BP being used as a certificate of political legitimacy. BP’s name to prove the continuity of a leader, to sanctify a decision, to make a political turn historical. But what would be the most honest way of remembering him? Perhaps this: to preserve the freedom to question BP himself.

The question of religion in Deuba’s recent presentation is contextual here. It is necessary to repeat that a leader calling himself a Hindu is not anti-democratic. Believing or not believing in a religion is an individual’s freedom. But Nepal has already advanced on the constitutional journey of a republic, federalism and pluralism. That is why, when the top leader of an old democratic party links religious identity with the language of political restructuring and national identity, questions naturally arise. Even in the document that emerged from the meeting of Deuba’s faction in the Congress, there appears an urge to link the *Sanatan Dharma* and cultural tradition with national identity. The problem is not religion itself, but its potential to become a political instrument.

The Panchayat too had constructed an official cultural imagination of the nation. It allowed space for diversity, but it did not insist democratically on the political equality of diversity. The challenge of the republic is different. The nation’s cultural identity need not

be one. Citizens must be equal. In Nepal’s cultural heritage, the place of Hindu tradition is undisputed. But the constitutional identity of the modern nation must be kept separate from the religious majority’s cultural self-confidence.

Nepal is not the country of only one culture. Madheshis, Janajatis, Dalits, Muslims, Tharus and many other communities are citizens of this republic, each carrying their own identity, memory and aspirations. Democracy’s beauty is precisely that the state does not make any one identity the contractor of nationalism. Therefore, the question is not only of Deuba, but also of the Congress. Are we using the language of religion to embrace pluralism or to dissolve pluralism into a cultural majority?

Yesterday, there was the *jai-jaikaar* of the king. Today there can be the *jai-jaikaar* of the leader. Yesterday, being close to the palace was power. Today, being around the party leadership can become power. Yesterday, asking questions was uncomfortable. Today, dissent can be sidelined by labelling it as factionalism. The Panchayat has gone. But the *Panchayati* psychology has somewhere remained within us.

Perhaps this could be the greatest irony of Deuba’s political life; he had struggled against the Panchayat, but history is now placing him before another test. Can he rise above his own political legacy for the institutional transformation of a democratic party? A leader’s greatness is not decided only by how long they have led. Sometimes greatness lies in the capacity to leave the place they have created for others. In political life, there comes a time when a leader moves from the place of making history to the place of becoming history. When this transition cannot be accepted, even a democratic leader begins to create a small court around them. And it is from here that the question goes beyond Deuba.

We changed the constitution. But has political culture changed? We brought federalism, but did the centralised political mentality change? If the answers to these questions continue to remain negative, then the problem will not be only Deuba’s. Panchayat-isation of Deuba will no longer remain a satirical expression used for one person. It will become the name of that old shadow that is still alive within Nepal’s democracy. The Panchayat system has ended. But the end of the *Panchayati* mindset is perhaps still pending.

The author is a veteran journalist.

THEIR VIEW

Say no to impunity

Every child development centre must have a mechanism to report sexual misconduct.

We are deeply concerned by the allegations made against the former superintendent of the government’s Child Development Centre for girls in Konabari, Gazipur. Reportedly, six residents of the centre accused Md Setaruzzaman of sexual harassment, including calling them alone into his room, touching them inappropriately and forcing them to watch pornography. There were also allegations of threats, bribery, and an attempt to make a pregnant girl undergo an abortion. The residents submitted a written complaint against him last July. Setaruzzaman was eventually suspended following an investigation, only to be cleared of the allegations at a subsequent departmental hearing on the grounds that the allegations were not proven beyond doubt.

The decision deserves careful scrutiny. Allegations involving vulnerable children cannot simply be dismissed without a transparent and credible investigation. Child development centres are meant to rehabilitate children and adolescents in conflict with the law and help them return to mainstream society. There are currently two centres for boys, in Jashore and Tongi, and one for girls, in Konabari, Gazipur. Concerns have long been raised about whether the environment, management, education, food, security and healthcare of these centres adequately serve the needs of children. The latest allegations further expose serious weaknesses in oversight at these centres. Previous investigations into deaths, violence, and other incidents have produced several recommendations, but many have not been implemented. As experts have pointed out, those responsible for running these institutions need proper training and a more child-centred approach.

The official who conducted the recent investigation in the case reportedly said that clearing Setaruzzaman was not justified. This makes an independent review of the case essential, ensuring that all relevant evidence, including the accounts of the girls and staff members, is properly examined. The investigation must also ensure that complainants are not intimidated or pressured. Allegations against other personnel, including a house parent who was also accused of sexual harassment, must be investigated as well.

The Ministry of Social Welfare and the Department of Social Services must strengthen oversight of these institutions through regular independent inspections and prompt probes into complaints against officials and staff. Most importantly, every child development centre must have a functional and confidential mechanism through which residents can report sexual harassment, abuse, threats or other misconduct. A complaint cell staffed by trained female personnel or other trusted professionals could help create a safer environment for girls to report. The authorities must also review the security arrangements in these centres and ensure that staff members follow the codes of conduct. The state cannot continue to falter on its responsibility to protect these vulnerable children.

MITRA PARIYAR



I prefer to describe the caste system in modern-day Nepal (and, of course, India) with the metaphor of the sewage system. Much of it is subterranean, invisible in public, but operative all the same. And it greatly influences every person, every home, every community and every government.

Whatever one may think of the incumbent government, sociologically speaking, there’s been a significant paradigm shift. I don’t just mean the generational change. After decades, a young Madheshi man from the lower stratum of society rules the country. In a long while, we haven’t had a leader who doesn’t wear a *janai*, a sacred thread.

It’s an irony, however, that the same executive head seems intent on promoting Hinduism in public life. Otherwise, he wouldn’t have held elaborate ceremonies with 108 Brahmins reciting Vedic mantras at his swearing-in.

Balendra Shah has little political will to strengthen the dignity and rights of the Madheshi communities and of the lower castes. We haven’t seen any signs of that in the past five months. His Cabinet may be working for change on many fronts, but it has done nothing to tackle structural change. They don’t talk about it, let alone do something about it. Nor do parliamentarians from the ruling Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) raise their voices for change in this area. Even some of the charismatic Dalit activists-turned-lawmakers, such as the controversial Khagendra Sunar, have remained silent.

People would appreciate even a small gesture towards challenging Brahmanism. Jettisoning the festival of *Janai* Purnima from the list of national holidays would, for example, win the kudos of many Dalits and ethnic minorities. *Janai* Purnima falls on August 28 this year, heralding the festive season. It’s the day the upper castes change their *janai*, the sacred thread. The *janai* symbolises the ritual purity, cultural domination and political authority of the upper castes. So, this

is strictly a celebration of Brahmins and Chhetris.

And yet, as a national holiday, the majority of the population that doesn’t receive the sacred thread—mainly Dalits and ethnic groups—are also made to celebrate the day as a special occasion. In other words, these communities are forced by the state, as it were, to applaud and affirm their own domination.

This has been the case since the Puranic period. The unclean or lower castes are ritually excluded by denying them the sacred thread. Thus, a festival like Janai Purnima re-affirms and consolidates caste hierarchy—in contravention of the constitution and law.



POST FILE PHOTO

Yet, many people celebrate the festival uncritically. Even the seasoned advocates of Dalit rights refuse to raise a voice against such state-sponsored events and activities that implicitly strengthen caste hierarchy.

It’s a pity, as aforementioned, that even a prime minister from the marginalised oil-pressing Telis community doesn’t see any issues with festivities like Janai Purnima. Is he blinded by his faith? Or perhaps he doesn’t dare do anything to upset the apple cart!

peace and harmony alongside each other, as they have always done in this country. The last thing we want is communal hatred and violence.

But the issues of caste hatred *within* the dominant Hindu communities are too great to ignore. It’s sad that nobody gives it a thought when they stress on ‘social goodwill’. In fact, inter-caste tensions have greater potential than inter-religious tensions. The way upper or cleaner castes exclude, humiliate and attack the lower or unclean castes

is far worse than how a Hindu treats a Muslim in our country.

I was delighted to read a recent *Onlinekhabar* article by TU sociology professor and commentator Chaitanya Mishra. He hits the nail on the head by arguing that caste discrimination is a ‘special’ case of religious discrimination. I have been trying hard to bring religion into our debates about caste discrimination, with limited success. Even Dalit intellectuals refrain from problematising their clear religious injunctions that actively promote casteism.

Mishra’s line is brave and objective and very useful for promoting ‘social goodwill’. It targets the root problems. The slogan of social goodwill would mean nothing until caste-based ill-will and disharmony and even violence are allowed to persist, uncritically, like an open sewer.

Unfortunately, our line is still in a great minority. The majority attitude is reflected in another (emeritus) TU professor and well-known political commentator Surendra KC’s recent observations. Reacting to Sher Bahadur Deuba’s comments about the Hindu religion, KC argued that religion must not be brought into political debates and discussions. He said that we (that is, the elites from the dominant castes) must continue to follow our *kul dharma* at home and let people of different faiths and castes do what they want to do.

On the face of it, KC’s observation may seem harmless, but it has sinister objectives. He wants to preserve the caste hierarchy silently, as a domestic tradition—the anti-caste laws notwithstanding.

If we want to eradicate the seeds of social disharmony and communal violence, rather than merely reacting when problems appear, we must follow Mishra’s advice. We must problematise all social issues including those umbilically connected to the dominant religion and culture.

The religious and cultural matters are highly sensitive and challenging. They need to be re-imagined and reformed according to modern law. But not talking about them at all—as KC advises—is not a durable solution. People normally don’t even think, let alone talk about the sewer. But what happens when it’s blocked, broken or poorly managed?

Pariyar is a Dalit rights activist.

